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ABSTRACT
Android framework-specific app crashes are hard to debug. Indeed,
the callback-based event-driven mechanism of Android challenges
crash localization techniques that are developed for traditional Java
programs. The key challenge stems from the fact that the buggy
code location may not even be listed within the stack trace. For
example, our empirical study on 500 framework-specific crashes
from an open benchmark has revealed that 37 percent of the crash
types are related to bugs that are outside the stack traces. Moreover,
Android programs are a mixture of code and extra-code artifacts
such as the Manifest file. The fact that any artifact can lead to
failures in the app execution creates the need to position the lo-
calization target beyond the code realm. In this paper, we propose
Anchor, a two-phase suspicious bug location suggestion tool. An-
chor specializes in finding crash-inducing bugs outside the stack
trace. Anchor is lightweight and source code independent since
it only requires the crash message and the apk file to locate the
fault. Experimental results, collected via cross-validation and in-the-
wild dataset evaluation, show that Anchor is effective in locating
Android framework-specific crashing faults.
KEYWORDS
Android Crash, Crashing Fault, Fault Localization.
1 INTRODUCTION
App crashes are a recurrent phenomenon in the Android ecosys-
tem [1]. They generally cause damages to the app reputation and
beyond that to the provider’s brand [2]. Apps with toomany crashes
can even be simply uninstalled by annoyed users. They could also
receive bad reviews which limit their adoption by new users. Too
many apps crashes could also be detrimental to specific app markets
that do not provide mechanisms to filter out low-quality apps con-
cerning proneness to crash. The challenges of addressing Android
app crashes have attracted attention in the research community.
Fan et al. [3] have recently presented insights on their large-scale
study on framework-specific exceptions raised by open source apps.
∗Corresponding author.
In more recent work, Kong et al. [4] have proposed an automated
approach to mine fix patterns from the evolution of closed-source
apps (despite the lack of change tracking systems). Tan et al. [5]
further presented an approach to repair Android crashing apps. A
common trait of all these crash-related studies is that the underlying
approaches heavily rely on the generated stack traces to identify
the fault locations. Although the state of the art is effective for
many bugs, they are generally tailored to the generic cases where
the stack traces provide relevant information for locating the bug.
Unfortunately, there is a fair share of faults whose root causes
may remain invisible outside the stack trace. Wu et al. [6] have
already reported this issue in their tentative to locate crashing
faults for general-purpose software. In the realm of Android, the
phenomenon where the stack trace may be irrelevant for fault
localization is exacerbated by two specificities of Android:
The Android system is supported by a callback-based and event-
driven mechanism: Each component in Android has its lifecycle
and is managed by a set of callbacks. Every callback serves as a
standalone entry point and root to a separate call graph. Yet, ex-
isting crash-inducing bug localization techniques for Java such as
CrashLocator [6] assume a single entry point to compute certain
metrics for the suspiciousness score of different methods. Addi-
tionally, since the Android system is event-driven, the invocation
sequence to functions and callbacks is affected by non-deterministic
user inputs or system events, making the stack trace unreliable for
quick analyses.
The Android app package includes both code and resources that
together form the program: Android apps are more than just code.
They are combinations of Java/Kotlin code, XML files, and resources
(such as images and databases). Apps provide extensions to the An-
droid Operating System (OS), which directly analyses XML files
from the app to map callback functions, which the OS must trigger
to exploit functionalities in the apps. Therefore, an error by devel-
opers within an XML document can eventually lead to a runtime
crash. Similarly, it is important to note that crashes can occur due
to other concerns such as the arrangements of app resources, use
of deprecated APIs, omissions in permission requests, etc. Typical
such errors, which occur outside of code pointed to by stack traces,
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will cause either developers or Automatic Program Repair (APR)
tools (e.g., [5]) to pointlessly devote time in attempting to fix the
code.
This paper. Our work aims at informing the research com-
munity on the acute challenges of debugging framework-specific
crashes. To that end, we propose to perform an empirical study that
investigates the share of crashes that cannot be located by current
localization approaches. Following this study, we present a new
approach to locate faults, aiming at covering different categories of
root cause locations. Overall, we make the following contributions:
• We present the results of an empirical study performed
on a set of 500 app crashes retrieved from the ReCBench
dataset [4]. A key finding in this study is that we were able
to identify that 37% crash root causes are associated with
crash cases where the stack trace is not directly relevant for
fault localization.
• We propose Anchor, a tool-supported approach for locating
crashing faults. Anchor unfolds in two phases and even-
tually yields a ranked list of location candidates. The first
phase applies a classification algorithm to categorize each
new crash into a specific category. Depending on this cate-
gory, a dedicated localization algorithm is developed in the
second phase. Anchor currently implements 3 localization
algorithms that eventually generate a ranked list of buggy
methods (when the bug is in the code) or resource types
(when it is outside of code).
• We performed 5-fold cross-validation on the 500 crash cases
to assess the effectiveness of Anchor in placing the crashing
fault location in the top of its ranked list of suggestions. An-
chor exhibited an overall MRR (Mean Reciprocal Rank) met-
ric value of 0.85. An analysis of the open dataset of crashed
open-source Android apps further shows that our method
scales to new app crashes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces background details on Android app crashes and callback-
based event-driven mechanisms. Section 3 revisits the motivating
example by the previous work [5] and demonstrates why research
in crash localization has standing challenges. Section 4 discusses the
findings of our empirical study and explores the insights that can
be leveraged for a new approach. Section 5 presents Anchor. We
describe experimental setup in Section 6 and approach evaluation
in Section 7. We bring further discussion in Section 8. Threats to va-
lidity are acknowledged in Section 9 and related work is presented
in Section 10. Finally, Section 11 concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce the important concepts related to this
paper.
2.1 Android App Crash Stack Trace
Like all Java1 based software, when Android apps crash, they can
dump execution traces which include the exception being thrown,
a crash message, and most importantly, a stack trace of a callee-
caller chain starting from the Signaler, i.e., the method that initially
1Kotlin has also been widely used in recent years as an alternative for Android app
development, it is designed to fully interoperate with Java.
constructed and threw the exception object. Figure 1 is an example
of stack trace for the crash of the app Sailer’s Log Book. This app
helps sailors to keep their logbook accurate and up-to-date. On
the first line, the exception IllegalArgumentException is thrown. On
the second line, the log system reports message "recursive entry
to executePendingTransactions". Starting from the third line, the
Signaler of the stack trace is listed: it is this framework method
that instantiates the exception type, composes the log message
and throws it to its caller to handle. On Lines 4-5 that are also
marked in grey, there are other two methods that continue to pass
on the exception. Line 5 holds the API, which is the only framework
method in this stack trace that is visible to the developer. Since the
crash happens directly due to invocation to it, we call it the Crash
API. Line 6 is the developer method that invoked this API. Line 7 is
the developer implementation of the callback, inherited from the
superclass of the Android framework. Android framework decides,
based on certain conditions and system/user events, when to invoke
this method, and what parameter values to pass in. Lines 8-9 are
part of the Android framework core that is, again, not accessible to
developers.
com.android.internal.os.ZygoteInit.main
com.android.internal.os.ZygoteInit$MethodAndArgsCaller.run
com.poterion.logbook.fragments.SettingsFragment.

onSharedPreferenceChanged
com.poterion.logbook.activities.MainActivity.show
android.app.FragmentManagerImpl.executePendingTransactions
android.app.FragmentManagerImpl.popBackStackImmediate
android.app.FragmentManagerImpl.executePendingActions
Callback
Crash API
Signaler
Core
Crash 

method
Framework
Framework
Developer
IllegalArgumentExceptionException
Recursive entry to executePendingTransactions.Message
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Figure 1: Crash Stack Trace of app Sailer’s Log Book.
The crash stack trace is often the first thing that developers
want to examine when a crash is reported [7]. Even when it is not
given, developers would reproduce and retrieve them. Intuitively,
the crash arises from mistakes in the developer methods, e.g., Lines
6-7 in Figure 1. Particularly, the Crash method that directly invoked
the Crash API. Our empirical study in Section 4 shows that this
intuition is correct, that 63% of the total crash types are in the stack
trace. However, in the rest of this section, we will introduce the
specialty of Android that may lead to the rest 37%.
2.2 Callback-based and Event-driven
Mechanism
Unlike traditional Java programs, Android apps have multiple en-
try points. Each entry point is a callback method (e.g., Line 7 in
Figure 1), which is declared in one of the Android framework com-
ponent classes, inherited by the developer defined subclass, and
maybe overridden by the developer. The Android framework core,
based on the user inputs and system environments, decides when
to invoke the callbacks and what parameter values to pass in. Each
callback is standalone, and in general Android does not encourage
developers to invoke those callbacks from their self-defined meth-
ods, unless these methods are callbacks overriding and invoking
2
their super. As a result, existing static call graph based fault local-
ization techniques [6] for Java programs can not be simply reused,
since they assume single entry points and need to compute weigh-
ing scores based on the graph. There are, however, works [8, 9] that
have invented methods to track the control flows or data flows and
tried to build the callback connections. These proposed approaches
are either computationally expensive or confined in limited number
of component classes, and does not scale to all scenarios. Other
approaches like [10] or [11] create a dummy main to invoke all
callbacks in order to reuse Java based analysis tools, but this method
discarded the relation among callbacks, which is crucial to estimate
the possibility of a method containing the real bug.
X
Android Framework core
f4
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f2
f14
f13
f12
f24
f23
f22
f10 f15
f25
?
?
Android Framework Core
A developer method 
in the stack trace
A developer method 
outside the stack trace
The crash method in the 
stack trace that invokes 
the Crash API
? The buggy method
Figure 2: Call Graph Comparison between General Java Pro-
gram (left) and Android App (right), inspired from [6]
Figure 2 examplifies the difference of call graphs between gen-
eral Java program (left) and Android app (right). The filled circles
represent the developer methods in the stack trace, while the non-
filled circles represent developer methods outside the stack trace.
The partially filled circles represent the Crash method that invokes
the Crash API. Generally, the buggy method is the Crash method.
However, as shown in our empirical study, it appears that the buggy
method (the circle filled with question mark in Figure 2) is not con-
nected to the Crash method. A traditional Java program static call
graph based approach such as CrashLocator [6] will be able to lo-
cate this buggy method only if the buggy method is "close enough"
to the generated call graph (roughly speaking they generate an
extended call graph leveraging the stack trace). However, on the
right, in the case of Android apps, the buggy method could be in a
separate call graph because of callback methods that are invoked by
the Android framework. Such cases will be missed by approaches
such as CrashLocator [6] that only detects buggy methods captured
by its extended call graph, but does not consider callback methods.
2.3 Android APK File Format
Android apps are distributed in a package file format with extension
".apk". It is a compressed folder containing code, resources, assets,
certificates, and manifest file. All of these files are crucial to the
expected good functioning of the apps. Therefore, some crashes
may be induced when there are problems with these files.
2.3.1 Android Manifest File. Every app project needs to have an
AndroidManifest.xml file at the root of the project source set [12].
Along with the package name and components of the app, this file
also declares the permissions that the apps needs, as well as the
hardware and software features that the app requires.
2.3.2 Android Component Layout Description File. Android com-
ponent layout description files are also crucial to the execution
of the app. E.g., Listing 1 is the layout file of the main Activity of
an Android app Transistor. In this file, a child fragment is defined
and described. The attribute android:id defines the layout file name
to be inflated for the fragment, the attribute android:name gives
the full name of the user defined Fragment class. When the main
Activity is being created, the Android framework scans this layout
file, and invokes a series of relevant callbacks on this Fragment to
draw it along with the main Activity.
Listing 1: Main Activity Layout File of app Transistor.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<fragment xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
xmlns:tools="http://schemas.android.com/tools"
android:id="@+id/fragment_main"
android:name="org.y20k.transistor.MainActivityFragment"
android:layout_width="match_parent"
android:layout_height="match_parent"
tools:layout="@layout/fragment_main" />
3 MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
We further illustrate the challenges of locating faults outside An-
droid app stack traces by revisiting an example that was used to
motivate a previous work on Android app crash automatic repair-
ing by Tan et al. [5]. Transistor2 is a popular online radio streaming
app. We showed its partial resources in Section 2.3.2. However, it
was reported that following the input sequence in Figure 3, the app
will crash.
Crash
(1) Open the app (2) Exit app by 
clicking back 
button 
(3) Open the app again (4) Click on image 
change icon
Figure 3: C ash of Transistor.
Listing 2: Crash Message of Transistor.
1 java.lang.IllegalStateException:
2 MainActivityFragment{e7db358} not attached to Activity
3 at ...MainActivityFragment.startActivityForResult(Fragment.java:925) (Crash API)
4 at ...agment.selectFromImagePicker(MainActivityFragment.java:482) (Crash method)
5 at ...k.transistor.MainActivityFragment.access$500(MainActivityFragment.java:58)
6 at ...transistor.MainActivityFragment$6.onReceive(MainActivityFragment.java:415)
The crash message filtered out from logcat is shown in List-
ing 2. It appears that invoking the startActivityForResult API on the
MainActivityFragment (line 3) throws an unhandled IllegalState-
Exception (line 1), and the Android system reports that the fragment
is not attached to the hosting activity (line 2). By inspecting the
source code of Android framework of the Crashed API (line 3), we
see that the startActivityForResult method of the fragment instance
attempts to invoke its context’s (i.e., its host Activity’s) API with
the same name startActivityForResult. This invocation is guarded
by an if-clause, which checks whether the fragment is still attached
to the host Activity. If not, however, the IllegalStateException will
be thrown.
2https://github.com/y20k/transistor/issues/21
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Listing 3: Fix from Tan et al.
new BroadcastReceiver(){
onReceive(...){ ...
+ if(getActivity()!=null)
startActivityForResult(pickImageIntent,REQUEST_LOAD_IMAGE);}}
Biased by the assumption that the fault should only be in the
developer methods in the stack trace (lines 4-6), Tan et al. [5] pro-
posed to amend the Crash method (line 4). Listing 3 shows their
fix. Their fix applies a checker on invocation to startActivityForRe-
sult, which will not be executed if value of getActivity is null (i.e.,
when the fragment is no longer attached to its hosting Activity).
As a result, the app avoids crashing. This fix indeed prevents the
exception. However, it is not explainable: applying the checker not
only prevents the crash, but it should also prevent opening the
SelectImageActivity as designed for. Due to this paradox, we have a
good reason to suspect that the true bug location is still hidden.
Transistor’s developer, who is also dedicated in debugging in the
stack trace, proposed a fix on her/his own in Listing 4. Realizing that
the Fragment lost its reference to the host Activity. The developer
declared a variable mActivity to hold the reference. Then in the
Crash method (line 4 in Listing 2), she/he switched the invocation
of the startActivityForResult API from Fragment to mActivity.
Listing 4: Fix from Developer.
+ mActivity = getActivity(); ...
new BroadcastReceiver(){
onReceive(...){ ...
- startActivityForResult(pickImageIntent,REQUEST_LOAD_IMAGE);
+ mActivity.startActivityForResult(pickImageIntent,
REQUEST_LOAD_IMAGE);}}
This fix also bypassed the crash, but it causes regression. After
the final step in Figure 3, if the user clicks on the back button two
more times, the app should have first returned to the MainActivity,
then back to the home screen. Instead, it opens another SelectImage-
Activity. In the issue tracking, the developer admits that she/he had
no idea of how to fix it. While after several months, the bug "fixed"
itself, which she/he described as "scary". Even Tan et al. failed to
explain the cause of this regression.
Based on the understanding of Android’ callback-based mecha-
nism introduced in Section 2.2, we suspect that the bug may not
exist in the stack trace.We confirmed our fix shown in Listing 5. This
fix is reported to the developer and we received positive feedback
in the issue tracking, as can be verified in Transistor’s respository
given above.
Listing 5: Fix Inspired by this Article.
MainActivityFragment extends Fragment{
onDestroy(){
+ super.onDestroy();
+ LocalBroadcastManager.getInstance(mApplication).
unregisterReceiver(imageChangeRequestReceiver,
imageChangeRequesIntentFilter);}}
We broaden the search for bug outside the stack trace. Notic-
ing the crash originated from the onReceive callback (cf. line 6 in
Listing 2), we examine the lifecycle of this BroadcastReceiver
object. We found that it is registered in the onCreate callback
of MainActivityFragment, but never unregistered in its coun-
terpart callback onDestroy. As a result, after Step 2 (cf. Figure 3),
the BroadcastReceiver and its host MainActivityFragment are
leaked in the memory. In Step 4, the callbacks of the leaked ob-
jects are stealthily invoked by the Android framework and even-
tually caused the IllegalStateException. Knowing the true cause
of the crash, it is not difficult to explain the paradox of Tan et
al.’s fix and the regression caused by the developer’s fix. How-
ever, given the page limit, we put detailed reasoning online at
https://anchor-locator.github.io.
Hint: The fault locations in Android apps may: (1) Be outside
the stack trace; (2) Be even outside the call graph extended from
the stack trace; (3) Not even “exist” in the code, i.e., they are
inherited methods without visible code snippets. Locating such
faults may require tremendous efforts. Fixes based on incorrect
localization may even cause regression.
4 EMPIRICAL STUDY ON FAULT LOCATIONS
In this section, we present the results of an empirical study that we
performed on a set of 500 app crashes retrieved from the ReCBench
dataset [4]. This study aims at assessing to what extent the locations
of crashing faults reside outside the stack trace.
4.1 Dataset Construction
We extract our dataset from ReCBench, an open dataset proposed
by Kong et al. [4] in 2019. ReCBench has been built by running
hundreds of thousands of Android apps downloaded from various
well-known Android markets [13, 14]. In addition to a collection
of crashed Android apps focusing on framework-specific crashes3,
ReCBench offers the possibility to collect crash log messages and
scripts to reproduce the crashes. Today, ReCBench contains more
than 1000 crashed apps (still growing). For our empirical study, we
focus on crashed apps for which:
• First, the stack trace of the crash contains at least one de-
veloper method. This is a requirement to be able to start an
exploration process to find the crash root cause.
• Second, since we specifically target the crashes induced by
Android APIs, the Signaler must be Android-specific.
After applying these two rules, we randomly selected 500 crashed
apps from the remaining apps. The dataset is publicly accessible at
https://github.com/anchor-locator/anchor.
4.2 Ground Truth & Results
We manually inspect all the 500 crashed apps to understand the
reason behind the crashes and to create our ground truth. We per-
form this manual inspection by leveraging the CodeInspect [15]
tool, following same protocols discussed in [3]. Each of the crashed
apps has been categorized into one of the following categories:
3Android framework methods are not visible or understandable to general developers,
hence greater challenge is acknowledged for locating framework-specific crashes
compared to developer-written methods. [3, 4]
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• Category A groups the crashed apps for which the buggy
method (i.e., the root cause) is one of the developer methods
present in the stack trace;
• Category B groups the crashed apps for which the buggy
method is not present in the stack trace, but still in the code.
• Category C groups the crashed apps for which the crash
arises from non-code reasons.
The above partition is one out of many alternatives, e.g., one
can also separate bugs based on whether they are concurrent [16–
20]. We later show in Section 5.2 how this partition helps with
building our localization tool. Table 1 summarizes the outcome of
the empirical study. It appears that for 89 (49+40) crashed apps
(representing 18% of the total cases), the crashing fault location is
not in any of the developer methods present in the stack trace. The
respective numbers of Categories B and C are close, with 49 cases in
Category B and 40 cases in Category C. To further investigate how
many types of crashes occur for each category, we use a method
similar to the one described in [4]: we group crashes from a given
category into buckets. Specifically, if two crash cases have identical
framework crash sub-trace, they will be put into the same bucket.
The last two columns in Table 1 present the number of buckets per
category. Overall, there are 105 types of crashes (i.e., buckets) in
the dataset. The percentage of types of crashes in Categories B and
C are 16% and 21%, respectively. In total, there are 37% of buckets
whose buggy reasons are not shown in the stack traces. Each unique
framework crash sub-trace suggests a unique type of crash-inducing
bug. Therefore, considering crash types encountered per the same
number of cases (buckets#/case#) in each category, more debugging
effort will be needed for Categories B and C than in Category A.
Table 1: Categories of Fault Locations in Android apps
Category stack trace code case# percent bucket# percent
A in yes 411 82% 66 63%
B out yes 49 10% 17 16%
C out no 40 8% 22 21%
Total - - 500 100% 105 100%
Hint: 18% of the crashes are due to bugs for which the location
is outside the stack trace. A significant number of root causes
(buckets), i.e., 37% (16%+21%), are associated with cases where
the stack trace is not directly relevant for localization. In even
21% of the cases, the root causes are not located in the code.
We now detail each category in the rest of this Section.
4.3 Category A: in Stack Trace
Category A includes all crash cases whose bugs reside in one of
the developer methods present in the stack trace. Most crashes in
our dataset fall into this category. It is expected that by default,
developers start their debugging process with the methods present
in the stack trace [21–24]. The automatic crash-inducing bug re-
pairing tool named Droix [5] implements a locater, by assuming
that the Crash method is the bug location in all scenarios. However,
we also notice that the true crashing fault may reside in other devel-
oper methods, in particular when moving downward in the stack
trace. An example of such a case is when the caller methods pass
an incorrect instance to the crashed developer methods. Generally,
much less effort is needed in locating faults in this category. Since
the number of suspected methods is limited and their names are
already known. Therefore they are not the focus of this paper.
4.4 Category B: out of Stack Trace, in the Code
It has drawn attention to researchers that Java program crashes can
be caused by methods that are not listed in stack traces. Approaches
like CrashLocator [6] broadens the search for such faulty methods
in extended call graphs from stack traces. We demonstrate in the
rest of this section why this broadened search is not enough for
Android apps. There are in total 49 cases in this category, each
crashed fromwrongly handling a framework API. Based on the type
of the framework API (call-in or callback), we further categorize
them into two sub-categories: (1) Misused Call-In APIs and (2)
Non-Overridden Callback APIs.
4.4.1 Type 1: Misused Call-In APIs (44 cases out of 49). This first
type groups crashing faults caused by the misuse of call-in APIs.
This means that the bug leading to a crash is due to a buggy explicit
invocation of an API from a developer method. Moreover, this invo-
cation is often performed from another implemented callback, other
than the callback in the stack trace. Since both callback methods
are triggered by the framework, it is unlikely that an extended call
graph can cover such methods (cf. Figure 2).
Listing 6: Bug Explanation to app Geography Learning.
public class MainActivity extends Activity{
onCreate(...){
try{bindService(intent,serviceConnection,integer);/*Bug Location*/
}...}...
onDestroy(){unbindService(serviceConnection);/*Crash location*/}}
Listing 6 gives a concrete example. This example is extracted
from an app named Geography Learning which helps users to
remember geography knowledge in a quiz game format. When
the MainActivity4 of this app is launched, the callback method
onCreate is automatically triggered by the Android framework.
Then, this onCreatemethod invokes the bindService API to bind
to Service. Service is one of the four basic components of Android,
and wrongly handling of Service is not uncommon [25] in An-
droid app development. When the user exits the MainActivity, the
Android Framework invokes the onDestroy callback method and
tries to unbind the Service bound in the onCreate method. There-
after, the app crashes with the exception type IllegalArgumentEx-
ception. Analysing the message which says: "Service not registered:
com.yamlearning. geographylearning.e.a.e@29f6021", we understand
that the Service has not been bound. In the method body of the
overridden onCreate callback, we found that the invocation to API
bindService was misused. Indeed, bindService is surrounded by a
try-catch clause, and another statement preceding this API invoca-
tion threw an exception which redirects the execution flow to the
catch block, skipping the invocation to bindService.
Out of a total of 49 cases in Category B, 44 falls into this sub-
category.
4The Main Activity of an app is the first screen shown to the user when launched.
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4.4.2 Type 2: Non-Overridden Callback APIs (5 cases out of 49). This
second type includes crashes caused by non-overridden callback
APIs. Callbacks, or call-afters, are APIs that are invoked when the
Android framework decides so, based on certain system environ-
ment change and/or user actions. Callbacks are inherited, when
developers define classes that are subclassing Android base com-
ponent classes. Developers are often required to override certain,
although not all, callback APIs. Forgetting to handle these callbacks
may cause apps to crash immediately. Moreover, these crashes may
often seem flaky, since its reproduction requires re-establishing the
same system environments and/or repeating user action sequences.
Existing Java crash locators fail to spot such bugs with two reasons:
(1) These callback APIs are not in the extended call graphs of stack
traces; (2) The method snippets in developer-defined codes do not
exist, so are easily missed.
Listing 7 shows an example of this crash type. The app Fengshui
Master is a Chinese fortune teller app. The app crashes when trying
to get a reference to the writable database. However, when the app
crashes, the exception SQLiteDatabaseException is triggered with a
message claiming "not able to downgrade database from version 19
to 17".
Listing 7: Bug Explanation to Android app Fenshui Master.
public class com.divination1518.f.s{
a(..){sqliteOpenHelper.getWritableDatabase();/*Crash location*/}}
public class com.divination1518.g.p extends SQLiteOpenHelper{ ...
+ onDowngrade(..){...}/*Bug Location*/}
According to the Android documentation, the app developer
needs to implement the callback method onDowngrade in the self-
defined subclass of SQLiteOpenHelper. This callback method will
be invoked when the database in storage has a higher version than
that of the system distribution. Failing to override this callback API
immediately crashes the app. Note that the motivating example (cf.
Section 3) also falls into this sub-category. Given the stealthiness of
this fault type, it is particularly difficult, even for a human developer,
to spot the bug reason without being very familiar with the Android
official documentation. Out of a total of 49 cases in Category B, 5
falls into this sub-category.
Note that we use apih to denote the wrongly handled API (call-in
API or callback API) for cases of Category B. This denotation is
later needed for Section 5.2.2.
4.5 Category C: out of Stack Trace, out of Code
As introduced in Section 2.3, except code, an Android apk also
contains resources, assets, certificate, and manifest. They are critical
to the functioning of the app. As a result, mistakes in those files
may also cause crashes. Table 2 gives a summary of the buggy
locations outside of code. As illustrated, eleven cases of crashes
originate from the Manifest.xml file. Most cases in this type are
because the permissions are not properly declared in the manifest.
Resources include specifically files with ".xml" extension (excluding
the Manifest.xml file). An Android app uses these resource files
to store the layout and pieces of information like string values. If
the required resource is missing or wrong, then the app will crash.
Assets are the large files, like fonts, images, bitmaps. Assets should
be put in the correct directory. If the Android framework is not able
to find them and it will crash the app.
Table 2: Crash Causes of Categorie C
Sub-Category Manifest Hardware Asset Resource Firmware
Cases 11 5 4 2 18
Aside from the files inside the apk, some constraints put forward
by the device’s hardware and firmware, i.e., the framework may
also cause the app to crash. For example, the Android billing service
can only be tested on real devices, if, however, tested on emulators,
the app crashes [26]. Also, since Android is quickly updated with
new features and designs, old apps may crash on newly distributed
devices, due to reasons like deprecated APIs and new security pro-
tocols established by the framework. Developers should generally
redesign the relevant functionalities, therefore no single buggy
location can be decided.
5 RANKING SUSPICIOUS LOCATIONS
To help developers identify the true fault locations when debugging
app crashes, including faults that reside outside the stack traces,
we propose Anchor. Anchor is a fault location recommendation
system based on a two-phase approach. In the first phase, Anchor
categorizes a given crash in one of the three categories (A, B, or C)
with a classification system. Then, in the second phase, according
to the decided category, Anchor each adopts a unique algorithm
to suggest a rank of locations that are suspected to contain the true
faults. The rest of this section describes Phase 1 and Phase 2 in
more detail.
5.1 Phase 1: Categorization
The first phase aims at assigning a new crash to one of the three
categories (A, B, or C). We use the Naïve Bayes algorithm [27]
for the categorization. Naïve Bayes is one of the most effective
and competitive algorithms in text-based classification. It is widely
used for spam detection [28, 29], weather forecasting [30], etc. It is
especially suitable in the scenario when the training set does not
contain a large number of records [31], e.g., our empirical dataset
contains merely 500 manually constructed records.
To construct a vector for each crash record, we feature words
extracted from the crash message. The value of each feature di-
mension is binary, indicating whether a word exists or not in
the message. More specifically, we extract three parts from the
crash message: (1) The exception type, which is a Java class (e.g.,
IllegalArgumentException); (2) The exception message, which
briefly describes the reason of the crash, e.g., line 2 in Figure 1;
(3) The top framework stack frames, each being a Java method,
e.g., lines 3-5 in Figure 1. For (1) and (3), we use “.” as the word
separator, for (2), we use space as the separator. To avoid overfitting
and to save computing resources, we do not need the entirety of
the vocabulary to build the vector. In Section 6.4, we further discuss
how many words are necessary.
With this categorization system, each new crash will firstly be
categorized as a type of "A", "B" or "C" before being processed in
Phase 2.
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5.2 Phase 2: Localization
The goal of this phase is to provide a rank of potential bug locations
(in descending order of suspiciousness), in the form of developer
methods when the bug is in the code (i.e., Categories A and B) and
of sub-categories when the bug is not in the code (i.e., Category
C). Before presenting in the following sub-sections 3 standalone
algorithms, one for each category, we explain how we compute a
similarity score between two crashes. This similarity score is used
in both Categories B and C localization algorithms.
Similarity between two Crashes:We quantify the similarity
between two crashes C1 and C2 by computing the similarity be-
tween their crash messages as presented in Equation 1:
SimC1,C2 = Edit_Sim(seqC1 , seqC2 ) (1)
seq is the sequence of framework stack frames in a crashmessage,
e.g., lines 3-5 in Figure 1. SimC1,C2 is then computed as the Edit
Similarity [32] between seqC1 and seqC2 . The intuition here is that
when two crashes share similar bug reasons, their seq tends to be
similar, if not identical.
5.2.1 Category A: In Stack Trace. Since the crash is assigned to Cat-
egory A, it indicates that the buggy method is one of the developer
methods in the stack trace. We inherit the intuition from [5], that if
the developer method is closer to the Crash API in the stack trace,
there is a higher chance that it contains the true fault. Therefore,
we can obtain the rank without changing the order of the developer
methods in the stack trace. For example, in Figure 1, methods on
line 6 and line 7 are respectively ranked first and second.
5.2.2 Category B: Out of Stack Trace, in the Code. When the crash
is classified into Category B, it indicates that the buggy developer
method is not in the stack trace, but still in the code. As discussed in
Section 4.4, the buggy method should either be a developer method
that misused a call-in API, or a callback API that has not been
overridden. In the remainder of this section, we will note apih this
API (call-in API or callback API) that has been wrongly handled (cf.
Section 4.4). To infer a ranked list of potentially buggy methods,
we propose Algorithm 1. The overall idea is, starting from each
developer method in the stack trace, in addition to examining the
developer methods (1) in the extend call graph, we also examine
those that either (2) control the Android components’ lifecycles, or
(3) are involved in the data flow of the crash. The computation of
the suspiciousness score follows the same intuition as explained in
Section 5.2.1.
First of all, Algorithm 1 requires three input data: (1) crash, the
crash under study; (2) ST, which is the list of developer methods
contained in the stack trace, e.g. lines 6-7 in Figure 1; (3) apih , the
wrongly handled API, which is approximated as the associated
wrongly handled API of the most similar crash present in Category
B of our empirical dataset. More formally, let be CrashB the set of
all the crashes in Category B. We identify the most similar crash
crashsim by following Equation 2. Since their crash reasons are
the most similar, it is with the highest possibility that both have
wrongly handled the same API.
Simcrash,crashsim =max(Simcrash,crashb ), crashb ∈ CrashB
(2)
Data: crash: the crash to resolve
Data: ST : List of developer methods in stack trace of crash
Data: apih : Wrongly handled API
Result: R: Rank of suspicious developer methods
1: S ← Developer methods that invoke apih ;
2: for s f ∈ ST do
3: if apih type “call-in” then
4: for s ∈ S do
5: for am ∈ AM do
6: if s links am then
7: s .score+ = 1d
8: end if
9: end for
10: end for
11: R ← S .sort()
12: else if apih type “callback” then
13: for nc ∈ NC do
14: if nc inherits apih then
15: R.put(nc)
16: end if
17: end for
18: end if
19: end for
Algorithm 1: Localization Algorithm for Category B
The algorithm starts with retrieving a set of developer methods S
from the entire apk that has invoked the apih (line 1). The outmost
for-loop (lines 2-19) loops over each stack frame s f in the stack
trace ST . Then based on the type of the apih , there are two sub-
routines: (a) when apih type is “call-in” (lines 4-11); (b) when apih
type is “callback” (lines 13-17). Next we discuss both sub-routines
in detail.
Sub-routine for type “call-in” is a for-loop (lines 4-11) that loops
over each method s in S . We then loop over (lines 5-9) all Active
Methods (AM) declared in the same class as s f , where Active Meth-
ods are methods having actual code snippets in the Java class files,
not including the inherited ones. The function links (line 6) checks
3 sub-conditions: (1) if s is invoked by am, or (2) if s and am are
declared in the same Java class or (3) if an instance of the declar-
ing class of s has been passed to am as a parameter. Sub-condition
(1) checks if s is in the extended call graph of am, same as loca-
tors like [6]. Sub-condition (2) implies that s is a callback method
that involves controling the component lifecycle as am does. Sub-
condition (3) implies potential data flow between s and am. When
the condition holds true in line 6, a score is added for s (line 7). Here
d is the distance between s f and Crashed API in the stack trace. It
reflects on the same intuition in Section 5.2.1.
Sub-routine for type “callback” is implemented with a for-loop
(lines 13-17) that loops over all the inherited Non-overridden Call-
back (NC) of the class where s f is declared. If nc inherits from apih
(line 14), it implies that overriding it may fix the problem, therefore
nc will be added to the rank R (line 15). With the same intuition in
Section 5.2.1, this sub-routine is designed so that when s f is closer
to Crashed API in the stack trace, nc is in the higher location in the
rank.
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Algorithm 1 addresses the concerns in the empirical study (cf.
Section 4.4). It can further locate faulty methods that are not in the
extended call graphs, or even methods without actual code snippets.
5.2.3 Category C: Out of Stack Trace, out of Code. Figure 4 de-
scribes the localization process for crashes that have been classified
into Category C. To infer a ranked list of potentially buggy loca-
tions, this process computes a suspiciousness score for each location.
Since the true fault locations in Category C are not in the code, the
locations in this ranked list are sub-categories (e.g. manifest, asset,
etc.).
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Figure 4: Localization Process for Category C.
With the new crash, we start by computing the similarity score
Simcrash,crashc , crashc ∈ CrashC . Here CrashC is the set of all
the crashes of Category C in the empirical dataset. In Figure 4,
the similarity scores are denoted as SimcaseID for short. We then
take an average of SimcaseID over the same sub-categories. Sub-
categories with higher similarity scores take higher positions in
the Rank .
6 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
This section clarifies the research questions, the metrics used to
assess Anchor, and the parameter values involved.
6.1 Research questions
We empirically validate the performance of Anchor by investigat-
ing the following research questions:
• RQ1: To what extent is the categorization strategy effective?
• RQ2: To what extent are the localization algorithms reliable?
• RQ3:What is the overall performance of Anchor?
• RQ4: How does Anchor perform on crashes in the wild?
6.2 Metrics
Crash localization is a recommendation problem. To measure the
performance of Anchor, we rely on rank-aware metrics, which are
widely used in information retrieval communities and have been
previously used to evaluate crash localization techniques [6].
Recall@k: The percentage of crash cases whose buggy func-
tions appear in top k locations. A higher score indicates better
performance of Anchor.
MRR (Mean Reciprocal Rank): The mean of the multiplicative
inverse of the rank of the first correct location. As defined in Equa-
tion 3, Ranki is the rank for the ith crash case, in a set of crash
cases E. A high value of MRR means developers on average need
to examine fewer locations in the rank, and therefore, a better
performance [33].
MRR =
1
|E |
|E |∑
i=1
1
Ranki
(3)
6.3 Cross-validation
We perform 5-fold cross-validation over the empirical dataset of 500
sample crashes. The dataset is randomly divided into 5 subsets of
100 sample crashes: 5 experiments are then carriedwhere every time
a specific subset of 100 is used as “test” data while the remaining
subsets containing the rest 400 cases are merged to form “training”
dataset. The computed performance metrics are then summed over
the 5 folds.
6.4 Feature Selection
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Figure 5: F Measure v.s. Selected Features.
In the empirical dataset, the vocabulary contains 1108 unique
words. To avoid over-fitting, we select only a portion of them for
Phase 1. We use the χ2 test for each word [34]. A higher value of χ2
indicates a stronger correlation between the word and the category.
Figure 5 shows the relation between the F Measure of Phase 1 and
the percentage of words chosen (ranked in descending order by
χ2 values). We can see that with the top 50% of the features, the
overall performance already stabilizes. We then always use top 50%
of the words in the vocabulary.
7 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
7.1 RQ1: Effectiveness of Categorization
We use our ground truth of 500 crashes to assess the performance
of Anchor in the first phase of the approach, namely the catego-
rization. We provide in Table 3 the confusion matrix as well as the
precision and recall of our experimental results. Anchor yields a
very high precision for predicting crashes in Category A, reaching
0.96. The precision for crashes in Categories B and C are compa-
rably lower, at 0.65 and 0.60, respectively. In terms of recall, the
approach is effective for Category A (0.91), Category B (0.82), and
Category C (0.75). Overall, Anchor is successful in categorizing
444 out of 500 crash samples (88.8%).
Answer to RQ1: Anchor is overall effective in categorizing
new crash samples. However, there is still room of improving
the precision when predicting samples in Categories B and C.
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Table 3: Effectiveness of Categorization (Phase 1)
Actual
A B C Total
Predicted as Category A 374 6 8 388
Predicted as Category B 20 40 2 62
Predicted as Category C 17 3 30 50
Total 411 49 40 500
Precision Recall
Category A 0.96 0.91
Category B 0.65 0.82
Category C 0.60 0.75
7.2 RQ2: Effectiveness of Localization
To evaluate the localization phase of Anchor, we consider sample
crashes for each category and assess the rank localization yielded
by the specific algorithm developed for that category. Table 4 sum-
marizes the Recall@k (with k ∈ {1, 5, 10} and MRR.
To make sure the evaluation of Phase 2 is not affected by the
outcome of Phase 1, we propose to assess the performance of local-
ization with the assumption of perfect categorization.
Table 4: Localization Performance
Category Recall@1 Recall@5 Recall@10 MRR
A 0.97(400/411) 0.99(406/411) 0.99(407/411) 0.98
B 0.39(19/49) 0.61(30/49) 0.63(31/49) 0.48
C 0.78(31/40) 1.00(40/40) 1.00(40/40) 0.85
Total 0.90(450/500) 0.95(476/500) 0.96(478/500) 0.92
For cases in Category A, the true fault location can almost always
be found at the top of the rank. The high value of MRR at 0.98
confirms the intuition in Section 5.2.1 that it takes much less effort
in finding fault location for Category A. For cases in Category B,
the recall@1 starts at 0.39 and increased substantially for recall@5
at 0.61. One more case is successfully located with recall@10 at
0.63. The overall MRR is 0.48. Given the fact that the search space
is vast (there can be tens of thousands of developer methods in
the apk), Algorithm 1 demonstrates decent performance. For most
cases in Category C, the true sub-category of the fault location can
be found topmost, with the MRR at 0.85.
Answer to RQ2: The localization algorithms (Phase 2) of An-
chor are reasonably effective for suggesting the correct fault
location. Anchor shows descent performance even when chal-
lenged by the vast search space for crashes in Category B.
7.3 RQ3: Overall Performance of Anchor
Table 5 summarizes the overall performance of Anchor combining
Phase 1 and 2. The MRR of all 3 categories slightly dropped, since
some cases are miscategorized in Phase 1. Clearly, the overall per-
formance is affected by Phase 1. However, since the two phases in
Anchor are loosely coupled, we envisage improvements of overall
performance in the future when better classifiers are proposed.
Answer to RQ3: Anchor is an effective approach for locat-
ing crashing faults when they are in/outside stack traces, even
outside code. Better performance is guaranteed when catego-
rization (Phase 1) is further improved.
Table 5: Overall Performance of Anchor
Category Recall@1 Recall@5 Recall@10 MRR
A 0.90(370/411) 0.91(373/411) 0.91(373/411) 0.90
B 0.37(18/49) 0.59(29/49) 0.61(30/49) 0.46
C 0.72(29/40) 0.75(30/40) 0.75(30/40) 0.73
Total 0.83(417/500) 0.86(432/500) 0.87(433/500) 0.85
7.4 RQ4: Performance in the Wild
The heuristics based on which Anchor is built may be biased by
the empirical dataset. To mitigate this threat, we assess the effec-
tiveness of Anchor with a dataset selected in the wild. We want
to verify to what extent Anchor can be generalized. We leverage
the independent dataset prepared by Fan et al. [3] who thoroughly
(by crawling the entire GitHub) and systematically (by applying
strict criteria) collected 194 crashed apks from open-source Android
repositories. Before evaluation, we apply the constraint rules of
Section 4.1, and focus on the 69 relevant crash cases that could
be identified. Note that this dataset contains true fault locations
already verified by the app developers. Since the cases in the dataset
are from a wide time span (2011-2017), the partition is randomly
decided on normal distribution over the year of app release.
Table 6: Categorization on an independent dataset.
Actual
A B C Total
Predicted as Category A 54 1 0 55
Predicted as Category B 3 6 0 9
Predicted as Category C 1 0 4 5
Total 58 7 4 69
Precision Recall
Category A 0.98 0.93
Category B 0.67 0.86
Category C 0.80 1.00
Table 6 shows the confusion matrix, as well as the precision and
recall of Phase 1 (categorization) on this independent dataset. The
precision for all categories is high, reaching 0.98 (54/55), 0.67 (6/9),
and 0.80 (4/5) respectively. The recalls are also high, at 0.93 (54/58)
for A, 0.86 (6/7) for B, and a perfect 1.00 (4/4) for C.
Table 7 provides measures for the overall performance. To com-
pute the similarity scores which are required to locate the bug re-
lated to crashes from Categories B and C, we use the crash records
from the empirical dataset. The recalls and MRR in Category A
remain high. As for Category B, Anchor is able to yield recall@k
values and MRR of 0.43 when suggesting fault locations. As for
Category C, the total MRR is at 0.43, suggesting more stack traces
in Category C might be the key for better performance.
Table 7: Recall@k and MRR on an independent dataset.
Category Recall@1 Recall@5 Recall@10 MRR
A 0.72(42/58) 0.93(54/58) 0.93(54/58) 0.81
B 0.43(3/7) 0.43(3/7) 0.43(3/7) 0.43
C 0.25(1/4) 1.00(4/4) 1.00(4/4) 0.40
Total 0.67(46/69) 0.88(61/69) 0.88(61/69) 0.74
Answer to RQ4: The evaluation on an independent dataset
shows that Anchor can be generalized. Anchor is a milestone
in this respect that it considers various crashing location cases.
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However, a community effort is still required to construct a
representative dataset of crashes to push forward the state of
the art in crashing fault localization.
8 DISSCUSSION
8.1 Comparing Anchor with other Locators
Along with their empirical analysis of Android app crashes, Fan
et al. [3] mentioned, in a single paragraph, a prototype crashing
fault locator: ExLocator. Unfortunately, since the tool has not been
publicly released, we could not directly compare it against Anchor.
We note, based on its description, however, that ExLocator has a
limited usage scenario since it focuses on only 5 exception types.
CrashLocator [6] can also locate faults outside the stack trace. How-
ever, CrashLocator needs to abstract patterns from a great number
of repeated crashes of the same project. Unfortunately, for both
datasets presented in this paper, this requirement is not satisfied.
Moreover, CrashLocator requires source code and change tracking
of the projects, unavailable for our empirical dataset. Therefore, we
are not able to apply CrashLocator.
Although direct comparison in terms of effectiveness is not pos-
sible in this scenario, we can compare the applicability. Anchor is
considered to have a wider application range compared to ExLo-
cator, i.e., it can be applied to all exception types, and considered
to be more lightweight and source code independent compared to
CrashLocator, i.e., it requires only the crash message and the apk.
8.2 Developer Effort for Locating Bugs
In the motivating example, we demonstrated why locating buggy
methods outside the stack trace can be challenging. We also want
to measure the effort that developers put in locating such bugs. In
Fan et al.’s dataset, each crash is documented with its duration, i.e.,
the time between the issue creation and its official closure by the
developers. For bugs in the stack trace, it takes developers 26 days
on average to close the issues. For bugs outside the stack trace, it
drastically increases to 41 days. The ratio is 41/26=158%. Although
it may not always be precise to measure effort in terms of issue
duration, this would confirm our observation to some extent.
9 THREATS TO VALIDITY
9.1 Internal Threats
In the empirical study presented in Section 4, we have manually
built the ground truth of buggy locations that we made available
to the community. Although we have tried our best to perform
this manual inspection with the help of (1) the Android official
documentation, (2) programmer information exchanging forums
like StackOverflow or GitHub, (3) tools such as Soot or CodeInspect,
there is no guarantee that all buggy locations we retrieved are the
true causes for the crashes. This might affect the conclusions we
draw from this dataset and the answers to RQ1-RQ3.
9.2 External Threats
We extracted our dataset from the open benchmark ReCBench built
by Kong et al [4]. Although the large dataset they propose con-
tains diverse apks collected from various popular app markets such
as Google Play (ensuring a good diversity of apps), the collected
crash cases are retrieved by testing apks with only two testing
tools. Therefore, the yielded crashes could not be representative of
the whole spectrum of crashes present in the Android ecosystem.
Similarly, the dataset proposed by Fan et al. [3] is extracted from
open source Android app GitHub repositories only. Moreover, they
have applied certain rules for collecting the crashed cases, e.g., they
extract only crash bugs that have been closed by repository main-
tainers. The potential limitations with both datasets may affect the
effectiveness we have shown in RQ1-RQ4.
10 RELATEDWORK
A recent survey by Wong et al. [35] marks the activity of identify-
ing the locations of faults in a program to be most tedious, time-
consuming, and expensive, yet equally critical. Therefore, lots of
techniques have been proposed attempting to ease the work of find-
ing the fault locations. Although we did not find a dedicated tool for
identifying locations in Android apps, there are some approaches
proposed for general software programs. For example, Wu et al. pro-
posed CrashLocator [6] to score and rank suspicious locations that
have caused program crashes. CrashLocator suggests that the buggy
methods can be located in the static call graphs extended from the
stack traces. However, it is not suitable to work on programs with
multiple entry points and separate call graphs such as Android
apps. Moreover, its scoring factors, which require source code and
change histories, also limit its application scope to Android apps,
for which most of them are released in a closed way (i.e., no change
histories). Gu et al. [36] proposed another approach called CraTer
that adopts information retrieval techniques to predict whether the
real fault resides inside the stack traces. However, CraTer is not
able to suggest the actual buggy location. BugLocator [37] applies
a revisited Vector Space Model (rSVM) to retrieve relevant files
for fixing a bug on a large number of bug reports. However, its
granularity falls in file level, which still requires human verification
for more fine-grained location identification. Wong et al. [38] build
their work on top of BugLocator [37] and leveraged stack trace to
improve the approach and indeed achieved better performance. Fan
et al. [3] briefly describes a fault localization prototype ExLocator
for Android apps. ExLcator only supports 5 exception types and
has a limited usage scenario. Furthermore, in the community of
Automatic Program Repair (APR), statement-level fault localization
is often among the first few steps. Researchers have improved it in
various aspects [39–45].
Many research works have been proposed to address Android
app crashes in recent years. For example, Fan et al. [3] performed
a large scale analysis on framework-specific Android app crashes.
They have invented the grouping techniques to group the Android
app crash cases into buckets to study similar root causes based
on each bucket. Researchers have also spent efforts attempting to
automatically reproduce the reported crashes [46, 47]. Indeed, to
achieve this purpose, Zhao et al. have proposed ReCDroid [48],
which applies a combination of natural language processing (NLP)
and dynamic GUI exploration to reproduce given crashes. Gómez
et al. [49] proposed another approach for reproducing crashes by
providing sensitive contexts. Moran et al. [50] further presented
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a prototype tool called CrashScope, aiming at generating an aug-
mented crash report to automatically reproduce crashes on target
devices. Researchers have gone one step deeper to propose auto-
mated tools to automatically fix such identified crashes. Indeed,
Tan et al. [5] have proposed an automatic repairing framework
named Droix for crashed Android apps. Droix adopts 8 manually
constructed fixing patterns on crashed Android apps to generate
app mutants and suggest one that fixes the crash. Following this
work, Kong et al. [4] present to the community an automatic fix
pattern generation approach named CraftDroid for fixing apps
suffering from crashes.
The special Android callback-based mechanism and its effect
have drawn the attention ofmany researcherswith the ever-booming
of Android devices. Yang et al. [8] targets the even-driven and
multi-entry point issue of Android apps, and proposed a program
representation that captures callback sequences by using context-
sensitive static analysis of callback methods. Flowdroid [11] targets
at exposing privacy leakages on Android phones. It establishes a
precise model of the Android lifecycle, which allows the analysis
to properly handle callbacks invoked by the Android framework.
Relda2 [51] is a light-weight and precise static resource leak de-
tection tool based on Function Call Graph (FCG) analysis, which
handles the features of the callbacks defined in the Android frame-
work. Together with other existing works like [10, 52], they all
dealt with Android callback-based mechanism in various manners.
Although these works are different from ours, their approach in han-
dling lifecycle and callback methods could be borrowed to enhance
our approach towards better dealing with Category B crashes.
11 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we performed an empirical study. This study shows
that 37% crash types are related to bugs that are outside the stack
traces, which imposes challenges to the localization problem. We
then proposedAnchor, a two-phase categorization and localization
tool that is able to generate a ranked list of bug locations for devel-
opers to examine. The effectiveness of Anchor is assessed with
both this empirical dataset and an in-the-wild scenario on a third-
party dataset. Our work brings inspiring insights into the crashing
faults localization problem for Android apps and calls for more
attention from both the developers and the research community.
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